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Abstract
Quantum correlation between two particles and among three particles show nonclassic properties that can be used
for providing secure transmission of information. In this paper, we propose two quantum key distribution schemes for
quantum cryptographic network, which use the correlation properties of two and three particles. One is implemented
by the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state, and another is implemented by the Bell states. These schemes need a
trusted information center like that in the classic cryptography. The optimal efficiency of the proposed protocols are
higher than that in the previous schemes.
PACS: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz, 03.67.-a
I. Introduction
Since the first finding that quantum effects may pro-
tect privacy information transmitted in an open quantum
channel by S.Wiesner [1], and then by C.H.Bennett and
G.Brassard [2], a remarkable surge of interest in the in-
ternational scientific and industrial community has pro-
pelled quantum cryptography into mainstream computer
science and physics. Furthermore, quantum cryptography
is becoming increasingly practical at a fast pace. Quan-
tum cryptography is a field that combines quantum theory
with information theory. The goal of this field is to use the
law of physics to provide secure information exchange, in
contrast to classical methods based on (unproven) com-
plexity assumption. Current investigations of quantum
cryptography involve three aspects: quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) [3-19], quantum secret sharing [20,21], and
quantum bit commitment and its application [22-23]. In
particular, quantum key distribution became especially
important due to technological advances which allow their
implementation in laboratory. The first quantum key dis-
tribution prototype, working over a distance of 32 centime-
ters in 1989, was implemented by means of laser transmit-
ting in free space [9]. Soon, experimental demonstrations
by optical fibber were set up [10]. Now the transmission
distance is extended to more than 30Km in the fiber [11],
and more than 205m in the free space [12].
Quantum key distribution is defined as a procedure
allowing legitimate two (multi-) users of communication
channel to establish exact two (multi-) copies, one copy
for each user, of a random and secret sequence of bits.
Quantum key distribution employs quantum phenomena
such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the quan-
tum correlation to protect distributions of cryptographic
keys. QKD is a technique that permits two (or multi-)
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parties, who share no secret information initially, to com-
municate over an open channel and to establish between
themselves a shared secret sequence of bits. The presented
QKD protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping
attack, in that, as a matter of fundamental principle, the
secret data can not be compromised unknowingly to the
legitimate users of the channel. Several quantum key dis-
tribution protocols have been proposed, all these proto-
cols can be classed into two kinds. i) The point-to-point
(two parties) quantum key distribution (pQKD). Three
main protocols of these are the BB84 protocol [3], B92
protocol [4] and EPR protocol [5-7]. ii) The networking
quantum key distribution (nQKD), e.g., the time-reserved
EPR protocol [8]. The physical implementation may be
refer to Townsend’s works [13,14].
For the pQKD scheme, the first quantum key distribu-
tion scheme, i.e., the Bennett Brassard (BB84) scheme,
was presented a decade ago. It is implemented by the four
states {| ↑〉, | ↓〉, | ր〉, | ց〉}, where any of the two states
{| ↑〉, | ↓〉} and any of the two states {| ր〉, | ց〉} are non-
commuted, {| ↑〉, | ↓〉} may be any orthogonal states of
two-dimensional Hilbert space. Its security is warranted
by the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. In
1992, Bennett devised another protocol, i.e., the B92 pro-
tocol, which is based on the transmission of nonorthogonal
quantum states. This protocol uses any two nonorthogo-
nal states to implement the QKD. Its security relies on the
no-cloning of unknown two-nonorthogonal states. A fur-
ther elegant scheme has been proposed by Ekert, which is
implemented by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs
[24]. It is called the EPR protocol which relies on the vi-
olation of the Bell inequalities [25] to provide the secret
security. Consider the two-particle correlation, Bennett et
al presented a modified version, in which the security is
warranted by the quantum correlation.
Recently, Biham, Huttner, and Mor proposed a nQKD
protocol, called time-reserved EPR protocol, in which
users prestore quantum states in a trusted center, where
their quantum states are preserved using quantum mem-
ories. The main procedures are as follows: users store
quantum states in quantum memories, kept in a transmis-
sion center. Upon request from two users, the center uses
two-bit gates to project the product state of two noncorre-
lated particles (one from each user) onto a fully entangled
state. As a result, the two users can share a secret bit,
which is unknown even to the center. The time-reserved
EPR protocol was proposed to be used in a quantum cryp-
tographic networking (QCN). The implementation of the
time-reserved EPR scheme needs four particle for obtain-
ing one qubit. One may ask that whether the nQKD
scheme may be implemented by three or two particle or
not? In this paper we propose several QKD protocols that
use three or two particles to obtain one qubit. These pro-
tocols can also be used in networking QKD.
In this work we suggest two nQKD schemes. The sug-
gested schemes need three parties: the trusted informa-
tion center and two users, by conventional called Alice
and Bob, here the center is trusted. One scheme is im-
plemented by the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) [26]
triplet state, we call this protocol as GHZ-nQKD proto-
col, in which the center’s role is to measure his/her particle
(from the GHZ triplet) by the random measurement like
that in BB84 protocol, and tell Alice and Bob the measure-
ment results. Another is implemented by the Bell states,
we call it as Bell-nQKD protocol. This scheme needs the
center to measure the two-particle entanglement system
by the Bell operators or the linear combination of Bell
operators before Alice’s and Bob’s measurement and send
the users his/her results. By the center’s assistance, the
users can obtain the secret key, the cheating center as well
as the eavesdropper (Eve) can not eavesdrop the key.
The paper is outlined as follows: First, in Sec. II, we
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review the two-particle maximally entangled states, the
so-called Bell states and the three-particle maximally en-
tangled states, the so-called GHZ triple state. In addition
we investigate the correlation properties of the GHZ triplet
and the Bell states. In Sec. III, we propose three proto-
cols, which are implemented by the GHZ triplet. The
efficiencies of these protocols are different, but they are
more practical, especially the protocol 3. The securities
of these protocols are analyzed. In Sec. IV, we propose
two protocols implemented by the Bell states. The secu-
rities of these protocols are investigated. In Sec. V, we
discuss the applications of our protocols in network QKD.
Conclusions are presented in Sec VI.
II. The Bell states and the GHZ triplet states
First we review the two and three particles entangle-
ment states. In general, N-particle entanglement states
may be written as [27]
|ψ〉 =
N∏
i=1
|ui〉 ±
N∏
i=1
|uci 〉, (1)
where ui stands for a binary variable ui ∈ {|z+〉, |z−〉} and
uci = 1− ui, |z+〉 and |z−〉 denote the spin eigenstates, or
equivalently the horizontal and vertical polarization eigen-
states, or equivalently any two-level system. For N = 2
they reduce to the Bell states and N = 3 and N = 4 they
represent the GHZ states. For a general N we shall call-
ing them cat states. In this paper, we are interested in
the case of N = 2 and N = 3, i.e., the Bell states and the
GHZ triplet state.
1. Bell states
Eq.(1) reduces to the Bell states when N = 2
|Ψ+〉c = 1√
2
(|z+〉a|z+〉b + |z−〉a|z−〉b), (2)
|Ψ−〉c = 1√
2
(|z+〉a|z+〉b − |z−〉a|z−〉b), (3)
|Φ+〉c = 1√
2
(|z+〉a|z−〉b + |z−〉a|z+〉b), (4)
|Φ−〉c = 1√
2
(|z+〉a|z−〉b − |z−〉a|z+〉b), (5)
where the subscripts c, a, b denote the states for the in-
formation center and the two communicators Alice and
Bob. These Bell states can be generated from a type-
II parametric down-conversion crystal [28]. Define the x
eigenstates
|x+〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉+ |z−〉), (6)
|x−〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉 − |z−〉), (7)
the four Bell states can be rewritten as
|Ψ+〉c = 1√
2
(|x+〉a|x+〉b + |x−〉a|x−〉b), (8)
|Ψ−〉c = 1√
2
(|x+〉a|x−〉b + |x−〉a|x+〉b), (9)
|Φ+〉c = 1√
2
(|x+〉a|x+〉b − |x−〉a|x−〉b), (10)
|Φ−〉c = 1√
2
(|x−〉a|x+〉b − |x+〉a|x−〉b), (11)
As should be noted, for example, the |Ψ+〉 states give
correlated results in both the z and x bases, but the
|Ψ−〉 state give correlated results in the z basis, but an-
ticorrelated results in the x basis. Summarizing these
correlated or anticorrelated results of the Bell states
{Ψ+,Ψ−,Φ+,Φ−} in the z and x bases, we get the fol-
lowing table:
Table I. The correlation of Bell states {Ψ+,Ψ−,Φ+,Φ−}
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Trent |Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉 |Φ+〉 |Φ−〉
Alice |x+〉 |x+〉 |x+〉 |x−〉
Bob |x+〉 |x−〉 |x+〉 |x+〉
Alice |x−〉 |x−〉 |x−〉 |x+〉
Bob |x−〉 |x+〉 |x−〉 |x−〉
Alice |z+〉 |z+〉 |z+〉 |z+〉
Bob |z+〉 |z+〉 |z−〉 |z−〉
Alice |z−〉 |z−〉 |z−〉 |z−〉
Bob |z−〉 |z−〉 |z+〉 |z+〉
From Table I it is clear that after the center has pro-
jected the two-particle entanglement system onto any of
the four Bell states {Ψ+,Ψ−,Φ+,Φ−}, the state of any of
two particles do not give determined results. For exam-
ple, if the center’s measurement basis is |Ψ+〉, the state of
any of two particles may be |x+〉,or |x−〉 with the prob-
ability 1
2
, or |z+〉 or |z−〉 with the probability 1
2
. Even if
Alice has measured her particle and announced her mea-
surement basis, anyone, including Bob, can not knows Al-
ice’s results, because the probability of making error is 1
2
.
However if the center’s bases are public announced, Alice
knows the Bob’s qubits and vice versa. These properties
may be used to distribute the quantum key between Alice
and Bob by the assistance of the trusted center.
By the four Bell states (Eq.2-Eq.5) one may obtain other
correlated or anticorrelated results. Define a line combi-
nation of Bell states as
|ψ+〉c = 1√
2
(|Ψ−〉c + |Φ+〉c), (12)
|ψ−〉c = 1√
2
(|Ψ−〉c − |Φ+〉c). (13)
One may get
|ψ+〉c = 1√
2
(|x+〉a|z+〉b + |x−〉a|z−〉b)
1√
2
(|z+〉a|x+〉b + |z−〉a|x−〉b),
(14)
|φ−〉c = 1√
2
(|x+〉a|z−〉b − |x−〉a|z+〉b)
1√
2
(|z+〉a|x−〉b + |z−〉a|x+〉b),
(15)
We note that the set of states {Φ+,Ψ−, φ−, ψ+} have the
following correlated or anticorrelated results
Table II. The correlation of states {Φ+,Ψ−, φ−, φ+}
Trent |Φ+〉 |Ψ−〉 |φ−〉 |ψ+〉
Alice |x+〉 |x+〉 |x+〉 |x+〉
Bob |x+〉 |x−〉 |z−〉 |z+〉
Alice |x−〉 |x−〉 |x−〉 |x−〉
Bob |x−〉 |x+〉 |z+〉 |z−〉
Alice |z+〉 |z+〉 |z+〉 |z+〉
Bob |z−〉 |z+〉 |x−〉 |x+〉
Alice |z−〉 |z−〉 |z−〉 |z−〉
Bob |z+〉 |z−〉 |x+〉 |x−〉
This table shows the states {Φ+,Ψ−, φ−, ψ+} also have
the correlation properties in x and z direction. If the
center projects the two-particle entanglement system onto
any of the four bases {Φ+,Ψ−, φ−, ψ+}, and sends respec-
tively Alice and Bob one of two-particle entanglement, Al-
ice’s and Bob’s particles have yet not a determined results
before their measurement. For example, if the center mea-
sure the two-particle system using the base φ−, Alice’s
measurement may be |x+〉 or |x−〉 if she measures her
particle use x basis. Before Alice reveals her measurement
bases, anyone can not know Alice’s results, even if Bob.
However, if Alice and Bob know the state measured by the
center and their measurement directions are determined,
they can judge the qubits each other.
2. GHZ triplet states
Eq.(1) reduces to eight GHZ triplet states for N = 3.
In this paper we use the following state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|z + z + z+〉+ |z − z − z−〉). (16)
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Suppose the center, Alice and Bob share one particle
each from a three-particle entangled GHZ state, then the
GHZ state may be represented by
|ψ〉= 1√
2
(|z+〉c|z+〉a|z+〉b + |z−〉c|z−〉a|z−〉b), (17)
where the first particle is that of the center, the second
that of Alice, and the third that of Bob. Define the y
eigenstates
|y+〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉+ i|z−〉), (18)
|y+〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉 − i|z−〉), (19)
and using the x eigenstates defined in Eq.(6,7), the GHZ
triplet state can be rewritten as
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|x+〉|x+〉 + |x−〉|x−〉)|x+〉
+(|x+〉|x−〉+ |x−〉|x+〉)|x−〉],
(20)
or
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|y+〉|y−〉+ |y−〉|y+〉)|x+〉
+(|x+〉|x−〉+ |x−〉|x+〉)|x−〉],
(21)
or
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|y+〉|x−〉+ |y−〉|x−〉)|y+〉
+(|y+〉|x+〉+ |y−〉|x−〉)|y−〉],
(22)
or
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|x+〉|y−〉+ |x−〉|y+〉)|y+〉
+(|x+〉|y+〉+ |x−〉|y−〉)|y−〉].
(23)
The above decomposition demonstrates the correlation
among three particles. For example, in Eq.(20) if one par-
ticle is in the state |x+〉 and the second particle is in the
state |x+〉, the third particle must be in the state |x+〉
because of the correlation of the GHZ triplet state. By
Eqs.(20-23), one may construct a lock-up table to summa-
rize these properties of GHZ states.
Table III. The correlation results of the GHZ triplet
states
Trent |x+〉 |x−〉 |y+〉 |y−〉
Alice |x+〉 |x+〉 |x+〉 |x+〉
Bob |x+〉 |x−〉 |y−〉 |y+〉
Alice |x−〉 |x−〉 |x−〉 |x−〉
Bob |x−〉 |x+〉 |y+〉 |y−〉
Alice |y+〉 |y+〉 |y+〉 |y+〉
Bob |y−〉 |y+〉 |x−〉 |x−〉
Alice |y−〉 |y−〉 |y−〉 |y−〉
Bob |y+〉 |y−〉 |x+〉 |x−〉
The table III shows several properties of the GHZ triplet
state: i) anyone of the three parties, i.e., the center, Alice
or Bob, can determine whether the other two participa-
tors’ results are the same or opposite and also that he
(she) will gain no knowledge of what their results actu-
ally are, if he (she) knows what measurements have been
made by the other two participators (that is x or y). ii)
From table III it is clear that allows two parties jointly,
but only jointly, to determine which was the measurement
outcome of the third party. So if the measurement direc-
tions of the three participators are public, the combined
results of any two participators can determine what the
result of the third party’s measurement was.
III. GHZ-nQKD protocols
GHZ states has already found a number of uses. They
form the basis of a very stringent test of local realistic the-
ories. It was also proposed that they can be used for cryp-
tographic conferencing or for multiparticle generations of
superdense coding [27]. In addition, related states can
be used to reduce communication complexity. Recently,
it was proposed that they can be used for quantum secret
sharing and quantum information split [19]. In this paper,
we use the GHZ state to distribute quantum key between
Alice and Bob by the center’s assistance. In the following
we present our quantum key distribution protocols.
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A. The protocols
As discussed in Sec. II, the GHZ state has correlation
properties that if only one communicator’s measurement
results is announced, the states of other two particles are
still not determined, but two communicators’ results can
determine the third result. These properties may be used
in the QKD relying on a third party. Let us now show
how to implement our quantum key distribution scheme
by the GHZ state. There are several way to distribute the
communicators the key by the center’s assistance.
Protocol 1
1. The center measures his GHZ particle in the x direc-
tion and obtains the result |x+〉 or |x−〉
2. The center tell Alice and Bob his measurement re-
sults.
3. Alice and Bob make respectively the random measure-
ment on their GHZ particles, either in the x or y di-
rection.
4. Check the eavesdropping by using the correlation prop-
erties of the GHZ states.
5. Alice and Bob compare their bases. If their measure-
ment bases are same, Alice and Bob keep their results,
otherwise they discard their results.
6. Alice and Bob obtain the final key by using the data
sifting, the error correction and the privacy amplifi-
cation technologies.
In this protocol, we let the center firstly measures his
particle from the GHZ triplet, and only measure it in the x
direction. The center’s results will be |x+〉 or |x−〉. After
the center has finished the measurement, Alice and Bob
measure their particles. This protocol only uses the cor-
relation results in the first and second columns of table
III. Of course, the center may randomly measure his GHZ
particles, either in the x or y direction, but the efficiency
is low by this way, because these results measured along
y direction have no use in this protocol and a half parti-
cles will be discarded, the efficiency is only 12.5%. The
center’s measurement collapses the GHZ triplet state to
be a two-particle system. The state of the two-particle
entanglement is not determined, because they may be any
of the states
|Ψ1〉ab = 1√
2
(|x+〉|x+〉 + |x−〉|x−〉),
|Ψ2〉ab = 1√
2
(|x+〉|x−〉 + |x−〉|x+〉),
|Ψ3〉ab = 1√
2
(|y+〉|y−〉+ |y−〉|y+〉),
|Ψ4〉ab = 1√
2
(|y+〉|y+〉+ |y−〉|y−〉).
In step 4, we use the correlation properties of the GHZ
states to check the eavesdropping. Having measured their
particles, Bob randomly chooses a subset of qubits from
his qubits and sends this subset to Alice. Alice compares
the corresponding results from the center, Bob and Alice.
If these results are correlation results, which are satisfy
Eqs.(20-23) or the correlation of three states is in the table
III, the results are perfect, otherwise it means eavesdrop-
ping or disturbed by noise.
In step 5, Alice and Bob compare their bases. Because
Alice and Bob randomly measure their particles either in
the x or y direction, some of their bases are different and
some are same. If their bases are different, Alice’s and
Bob’s results are no correlation, thus Alice can not know
Bob’s qubits and vice versa, in this case they need to dis-
card these results. However if their bases are same, their
results are correlated, Alice and Bob keep these results.
So this protocol discards the results that corresponds the
different bases.
The raw quantum key distribution is useless in practice
because limited eavesdropping may be undetectable, yet it
may leak some information, and errors are to be expected
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even in the absence of eavesdropping. For these reasons,
our scheme needs to supplement some classical tools such
as the privacy amplification, the error correction and the
data sifting, so we use these technologies in our protocol.
The implementation of these supplemented classic tools
are the same as in the previous documents [9].
In quantum key distribution some qubits (henceforth l)
will be wasted because of the loss and the inexactitude of
equipment, so in order to be left with a key of L qubits
the center 1 should prepare L′ > 2(L+ l). In this case the
efficiency is
η1 =
L
2(L+ l)
< 50%. (24)
This efficiency is larger than that of the time-reserved EPR
protocol, which is
η′ =
L
8(L+ l)
< 12.5%. (25)
Protocol 2
1. The center measures his GHZ particle either in the
x or y direction and obtains any of the four states
{|x+〉, |x−〉, |y+〉, |y−〉}
2. The center tells Alice and Bob his measurement re-
sults.
3. Alice and Bob make respectively a random measure-
ment on their GHZ particles, either in the x or y
direction.
4. Checking the eavesdropping like protocol 1.
5. Alice and Bob compare their bases. If the center’s
result is |x+〉 or |x−〉 and their measurement bases
are same, or if the center’s result is |y+〉 or |y−〉 and
their measurement bases are different, Alice and Bob
keep their results, otherwise they discard the results.
6. Alice makes her results to be consistent with Bob’s
results according to table III.
1assume the particles are prepared by the center in this paper
7. Alice and Bob gain the final key by using the data
sifting, the error correction and privacy amplification
technologies.
The protocol 2 lets the center measure his/her particle
either in the x or y direction. It is stresses that here
the center’s all measurement results are useful. When the
center’s result is the state |x+〉 or |x−〉, Alice and Bob
need to keep the results which have the same bases, but
if the center’s result is |y+〉 or |y−〉, the communicators
discard the results which have the same bases. The reason
is that the results must be correlated or anticorrelated.
This step is finshed in the step 5.
It needs to stress that Alice’s results must be consistent
with Bob’s results for getting the raw quantum key, so we
have the step 6. By the properties of the GHZ triplet state,
Alice (Bob) can judge Bob’s (Alice’s) results by combining
her (his) and the center’s results. But the table III can
not give completely a same results although Alice and Bob
can know the qubits each other. For example, when the
center’s and Alice’s results are respectively |y+〉 and |x+〉,
Bob’s result should be |y−〉, obviously, Alice’s and Bob’s
results are different. For obtaining a same key, Alice’s
(Bob’s) results need to be consistent with Bob’s (Alice’s)
results. The method is that Alice (Bob) transfers her (his)
qubits to binary bits according to Bob’s (Alice’s) results.
The efficiency of this protocol is the same as the protocol
1. After the center announced his results, Alice and Bob
have a possibility of 1/2 to obtain the correct results by
the random measurement. Consider the wasted qubits (l),
in order to be left with a key of L qubits the center should
send L′ > 2(L+ l), the efficiency
η2 =
L
2(L+ l)
< 50%. (26)
Protocol 3
1. Alice and Bob make respectively a random measure-
ment on their GHZ particles, either in the x or y
7
direction.
2. Alice and Bob send their measurement bases (x or y)
to the center, but not the qubit values.
3. The center randomly measures his particle according
to Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases. If both Alice
and Bob measure their particle using the same mea-
surement basis, e.g. x or y direction, the center mea-
sures his particle using the x measurement basis, oth-
erwise, the center measures his particle using the y
measurement basis.
4. The center announces his measurement results, which
is any of the four states {|x+〉, |x−〉, |y+〉, |y−〉}.
5. Check eavesdropping like the protocol 1.
6. Alice and Bob judge the quantum state each other ac-
cording to table III. While the center announces his
results, both Alice and Bob know the center’s results.
Then the Alice’s (Bob’s) and the center’s results can
jointly determine what is the Bob’s (Alice’) measure-
ment outcome.
7. Alice and Bob obtain a sharing key by using the data
sifting, the error correction and privacy amplification
technologies.
The important point is that Alice and Bob randomly
measure their GHZ particles before the center’s measure-
ment in this protocol, it is different from the protocols
1 and 2, in which the center’s measurement is completed
before Alice’s and Bob’s measurement. This change im-
proves the efficiency of this protocol, because the center
may measure his particle according to Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement bases. Although there are the situations
that Alice’s and Bob’s results are different, all their mea-
surement states are useful. The correlation of the GHZ
triplet state lets Alice know Bob’s qubits and vice versa,
so Alice and Bob can know the qubits each other in the
step 6. Consider the wasted qubits (l) in the measurement
and the loss in the quantum channel, in order to be left
with a key of L qubits the center should send L′ > (L+ l),
the efficiency is
η3 =
L
(L+ l)
< 100%. (27)
B. security analysis
These presented schemes are secure against eavesdrop-
ping. Their securities are warranted by the correlation of
the GHZ triplet. To see these in a sufficient way, we will
consider several possible eavesdropping in the following.
1. The cheating center’s attacks
The cheating center is impossible to know the quantum
key. From the table III it is clear that if the center knows
what measurements bases Alice and Bob made (that is, x
or y), he can determine whether their results are the same
or opposite and also that the center will gain no knowl-
edge of what Alice’s and Bob’s actually are, because the
cheating center will has the probability of 1/2 of making
a mistake. If the center makes measurement on the three
particles of the GHZ triplet, then send these particles to
Alice and Bob, the center’s measurement will introduce er-
rors in Alice’s and Bob’s results, thus Alice and Bob can
check it like the four-state BB84 protocol. Of course, a
cheating center may use the men-in-middle attack [29] to
obtain the key Kca and Kcb, where Kca represents the key
between Alice and the cheating center, and Kcb represents
the key between Bob and the cheating center. For pre-
venting this attacks, Alice and Bob may verify their iden-
tity using the identity verification technology [30]. This
method needs a sharing key between Alice and Bob, how-
ever, Alice and Bob, in general, have not sharing key, so
this case needs the center to be trustworthy like the key
distribution system used in the classic cryptography [29].
So in our scheme we assume the center is trusted, e.g.,
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the key distribution center (KDC) which is often used in
the classic cryptography, but here the center process the
qubits not the binary bits.
2. Intercept/resend attacks
Let us now consider the intercept/resend attack defined
in [9]. Suppose that the eavesdropper, by convention de-
noted by Eve, has managed to get a hold of Alice and Bob’s
key, she then intercepts a communicator’s (e.g. Alice) par-
ticle from the center and send another particle to Alice.
In this case, three particles of the center, Bob and the Eve
construct a GHZ triplet. However, because the Alice, Bob
and the center’s particles are not the GHZ triplet, there
are no correlated or anticorrelated result, Eve’s intercep-
tion will introduce error and can be detected by Alice and
Bob when they check the eavesdropping.
3. The entanglement attacks
The entanglement attacks is no use in our protocol. To
show that, Let us assume that the eavesdropper has been
able to entangle an ancilla in state |A〉 with the GHZ
triplet state that Alice and Bob are using. The state de-
scribing the state of the GHZ triplet and the ancilla is
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|z + z + z+〉+ |z − z − z−〉)⊗ |A〉. (28)
By using the x and y eigenstates and Eq.(20), The eaves-
dropper get
U |Ψ〉 = 1
2
(|x+ x+〉 ⊗ |x+〉 ⊗ |A1〉+ |x− x−〉 ⊗ |x+〉 ⊗ |A2〉
+|x+ x−〉 ⊗ |x−〉 ⊗ |A3〉+ |x− x+〉 ⊗ |x−〉 ⊗ |A4〉).
(29)
where U denote the unitary transformation. By projecting
the above state onto |φ〉 = α1|x+x+〉+α2|x−x−〉+α3|x+
x−〉+ α4|x− x+〉, the eavesdropper creates the states
|Ψ〉E = 1
2
(|x+〉⊗(α∗1|A1〉+α∗2|A2〉)+|x−〉⊗(α∗3|A3〉+α∗4|A4〉)).
(30)
If Eve can gain Alice’s (Bob’s) qubits, she can obtain the
key. However, Eq.(30) shows that Eve can not obtain
the results. By the similar method, Eve can not obtain
Alice’s (Bob’s) qubits when the GHZ triplet states satisfy
Eqs.(21-23).
IV. Bell-nQKD protocols
The above schemes are efficient, however they need
three particles. Can we implement the network QKD
scheme only by using two particles? In this section we
investigate the two-particle schemes. In the following we
show that one can also use the Bell states to implement
the above quantum key distribution procedure.
A. protocol
In Sec. II, we see that the two particles of the Bell
states or the linear combination of Bell states have corre-
lation properties, they are demonstrated in table I and II.
These properties may be used in the QKD relied on a third
party. Let us now show how to implement the quantum
key distribution by Bell states.
Protocol 4
1. The center prepares a set of two-particle entanglement
pairs and projects each pair onto any of the four Bell
bases.
2. The center sends respectively Alice and Bob one of
the two-particles entanglement and his measurement
results.
3. Alice and Bob make respectively the random measure-
ment on their particle, either in the x or z direction.
4. Alice and Bob check the eavesdropping by using the
correlation of Bell states.
5. If their measurement bases are same, Alice and Bob
keep their results, otherwise they discard the results.
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6. Alice and Bob obtain a sharing key by using the data
sifting, the error correction and the privacy amplifi-
cation technologies.
This scheme is similar to the time-reserved EPR proto-
col, but there are several important dissimilarities. i) The
time-reserved EPR protocol uses four particle and two par-
ticles were prestored in a transmission center, where their
quantum states are preserved using quantum memories.
Our scheme uses two particles and need not the quantum
memories. ii) The efficiency of the time-reserved EPR pro-
tocol is η′ < 12.5%, but the efficiency of our protocol is
η4 =
L
2(L+ l)
< 50%. (31)
iii) The center only uses results of the singlet states and its
correlation properties in the time-reserved EPR protocol,
but the center uses all quantum states in our scheme.
We can also use the table II to design a nQKD protocol.
The protocol goes as follows
Protocol 5
1. The center prepares a set of two-particle entanglement
pairs and projects each pair onto any of the four bases
{Φ+,Ψ−, φ−, ψ+, }.
2. The center sends respectively Alice and Bob one of
the two-particles entanglement and his measurement
results.
3. Alice and Bob make respectively the random measure-
ment on their particle, either in the x or z direction.
4. Check the eavesdropping by using the correlation
demonstrated in Table II.
5. Alice and Bob compare their bases. If the center’s re-
sult is one of the Bell states {|Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉} and their
measurement bases are same, or if the center’s result
is one of the states {|ψ+〉, |φ−〉} and their measure-
ment bases are different, Alice and Bob keep their re-
sults, otherwise they discard the results.
6. Alice makes her results be consistent with Bob’s re-
sults.
7. Alice and Bob obtain a sharing key by using the data
sifting, the error correction and privacy amplification
technologies.
This protocol is similar to the protocol 2, but there are
two dissimilarities: 1) The implementation of protocol 2
uses the GHZ triplet state, which needs three particles to
obtain one qubit. The center’s measurement result is one
of the state {|x+〉, |x−〉, |y+〉, |y−〉}. But the protocol 5
uses the Bell states which only use two particles, the cen-
ter’s results is one of the states {|Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, |ψ+〉, |φ−〉}.
2) The methods for checking eavesdropping are different.
Protocol 2 uses the correlation of the GHZ states, and here
protocol 5 uses the correlation demonstrated in the table
II.
According to the protocol 5, we see the efficiency is same
as protocol 2:
η5 =
L
2(L+ l)
< 50%. (32)
B. security analysis
In term of eavesdropping possibilities, protocols 4 and
5 have same security with the EPR protocol. After the
center has measured the two-particle entanglement sys-
tems by using any Bell operators or the linear combi-
nation Bell operators, Alice and Bob’s particles are two-
particle entanglement pairs, which is one of the four states
{|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, } or {|Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, }. It
has the same correlation as the EPR pair, this is there-
fore equivalent to the EPR scheme. So the cheating cen-
ter as well as the eavesdropper can not eavesdrop the key
from the protocols 4 and 5 by the currently eavesdrop-
ping technologies, e.g., the intercept/resend attacks, the
entanglement attacks etc..
V. Practical applications
10
Like the time-reserved EPR protocol, ours scheme
can also be used in the quantum cryptographic network
(QCN), not only in the quantum cryptographic network
with a centers and multiusers but also in the QCN of
worldwide network of many center. For the QCN of world-
wide network of many centers, we can also implement
the network QKD between two users by the teleporation
scheme. The ways are similar to the time-reserved EPR
protocol. As an example, we consider the QCN with a
center and multiusers. Assume that there are N users
denoted by ui, i = 1, 2, · · · , N and a trusted information
center, all users have registered their ID in this system at
the initial phase. When any user ui wants to connect the
other user uj who is in the same QCN, the user ui first
tells the center this message. The center verifies the user’s
identity by the quantum authentication technology [31] or
the classic authentication scheme [32]. If the identity is
correct, the center distributes GHZ particles or the two
particles of Bell states to users ui and uj , then they use
the proposed protocol to distribute the key between two
users. Here the users ui and uj are arbitrarily chosen.
VI. conclusion
We have show that the quantum correlation between
two particles and among three particles can be used for
the quantum key distribution relying on a trusted infor-
mation center. Two schemes are proposed. One scheme
is implemented by using the GHZ triplet states, in which
three protocols are proposed, these protocols use three
particles to obtain one qubit, and have optimal efficiency,
especially the protocol 3. The other is implemented by
the Bell state, in which two protocols are proposed, these
protocols use one Bell particle pairs to obtain one qubit.
In the process of quantum key distribution, the cen-
ter play an important role, however, the center can not
gain any information by any method except for the clas-
sic attack, i.e., the men-in-middle attack. For preventing
the men-in-middle attack, the presented schemes need the
trusted information center, or the users can verify the com-
municators’ identity (in fact all previous QKD protocols,
e.g., BB84, B92 and EPR protocol need this requisition in
practical application).
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